Abstract. Functional encryption is an emerging paradigm for public-key encryption which enables fine-grained control of access to encrypted data. Doubly-spatial encryption (DSE) captures all functionalities that we know how to realize via pairings-based assumptions, including (H)IBE, IPE, NIPE, CP-ABE and KP-ABE. In this paper, we propose a construction of DSE from the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. This also yields the first non-zero inner product encryption (NIPE) scheme based on DBDH. Quite surprisingly, we know how to realize NIPE and DSE from stronger assumptions in bilinear groups but not from the basic DBDH assumption. Along the way, we present a novel algebraic characterization of no instances for the DSE functionality, which we use crucially in the proof of security.
Introduction
Functional encryption is an emerging paradigm for public-key encryption which enables fine-grained control of access to encrypted data [18, 13] . In traditional public-key encryption, access to the encrypted data is all or nothing: given the secret key, one can decrypt and read the entire plaintext, but without it, nothing about the plaintext is revealed (other than its length). In functional encryption, ciphertext is associated with a value x and a secret key with a value y, and the secret key decrypts the ciphertext if and only if x and y satisfies some predicate. The security requirement is that of collusion resilience, namely any group of users collectively learns nothing about the plaintext if none of them is individually authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
Much of the literature on functional encryption started with constructions based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption [5] . Fix prime-order groups (G, G T ), endowed with an efficient symmetric bilinear map e : G × G → G T . Let g denote a random generator of G. The DBDH assumption stipulates that given g, g a , g b , g c , the quantity e(g, g) abc is pseudorandom. The DBDH assumption is extremely appealing in its simplicity: the assumption is simple to state, the ensuing schemes as well as the proof of security are typically extremely simple too; these schemes have also been standardized [8] . Furthermore, we continue to draw on the techniques developed in these early works: the development of lattice-based (hierarchical) identitybased encryption ((H)IBE) schemes in [11, 1, 2] parallel corresponding DBDH-based schemes in [10, 4, 20] and the simplest instantiations of the dual system encryption framework in [16, 17] proceed by "embedding" prior DBDH-based schemes into composite-order groups. The fundamental role that the DBDH assumption plays in functional encryption motivates us to understand the limitations on the functionalities that we can realize from the DBDH assumption: namely,
Our Results
Our main result is a construction of doubly-spatial encryption (DSE) from the basic DBDH assumption. This also yields the first NIPE scheme based on DBDH, which in turn yields identitybased revocable crypto-systems [3] . Along the way, we present a novel algebraic characterization of no instances for the DSE functionality (c.f. Lemma 1), which we use crucially in the proof of security. We compare our (D)SE schemes with prior works in Fig 1 . and decryption works whenever (x0 + span(X)) ∩ (y0 + span(Y)) ̸ = ∅. Note that d, m ≤ n. The parameters for our DSE scheme refers to that obtained by combining the construction in Section 3 and transformation in Appendix A. For SE, we set d = 0.
Warm-up. Before we present our construction, we define DSE more formally. In DSE, we associate a ciphertext with a vector matrix pair (x 0 , X) specifying an affine space x 0 + span(X), and a secret key with a matrix Y specifying a linear space ker(Y). Decryption is possible whenever
There is a generic transformation that allows us to handle affine spaces for secret keys starting from a construction for linear spaces (see Appendix A).
The starting point of our construction is the following DBDH-based spatial encryption scheme of Zhou and Cao [20] , which corresponds to the special case where X is the all-zeroes matrix, so that decryption is possible iff
Our first idea is to add g βXs to the ciphertext, which would allow the decryptor to "delegate" the ciphertext to any vector in the affine space x 0 + span(X). This turns out to be completely insecure; one way to see this is that an adversary can take linear combinations of the rows in X instead of the columns, since the term g βXs is insensitive to the rows or the columns of X. Hamburg's DSE scheme [14] breaks this asymmetry by "compressing" g βXs using a random linear combination of the rows (that is, β is replaced by a random vector b); the ensuing construction has a structure similar to the HIBE scheme in [7] and we only know how to prove security under a stronger q-type assumption.
Our construction. We replace the scalar β in the spatial encryption scheme with a random n × n matrix B, thereby breaking asymmetry while avoiding "compression":
To simulate the secret keys, we rely crucially on our new algebraic characterization in Lemma 1.
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by s ← r S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S and by x, y, z ← r S that all x, y, z are picked independently and uniformly at random from S. By PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Throughout, we use 1 λ as the security parameter. We use · to denote multiplication (or group operation) as well as componentwise multiplication. We use lower case boldface to denote (column) vectors over scalars and upper case boldface to denote vectors of group elements as well as matrices. Given two vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .), y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) over scalars, we use ⟨x, y⟩ to denote the standard dot product x ⊤ y. Given a group element g, we write g x to denote (g x 1 , g x 2 , . . .); we define g A where A is a matrix in an analogous way. Note that given a matrix of group elements g A , and a matrix B of "exponents", one can efficiently compute g AB ; we will also denote this computation by (g A ) B .
Linear algebra. Given an n × d matrix A over Z p , we write span(A) to denote the linear space {Au : u ∈ Z d p } ⊆ Z n p spanned by the columns of A, and we write ker(A) to denote the linear space {x : x ⊤ A = 0} ⊆ Z n p corresponding to the kernel of the column span of A.
Doubly-Spatial Encryption
A DSE scheme consists of five algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec, KeyDel):
The setup algorithm takes in a security parameter 1 λ , and a dimension parameter 1 n . It outputs public parameters mpk and a master secret key msk.
The encryption algorithm takes in the public parameters mpk, a vector matrix pair (x 0 , X), and a message m. It outputs a ciphertext ct (x 0 ,X) .
The key generation algorithm takes in the public parameters mpk, the master secret key msk, and a matrix Y. It outputs a secret key sk Y .
The decryption algorithm takes in the public parameters mpk, a secret key sk Y for Y, and a ciphertext ct (x 0 ,X) encrypted under (x 0 , X). It outputs a message
The key delegation algorithm takes in the public parameters mpk, a secret key sk Y , and a matrix Y ′ , where span(
Delegation. We require that delegation is independent of the path taken; that is, if span(Y ′ ) ⊆ span(Y), then the following distributions are identical:
Selective Security Model
We now give the notion of selective security for DSE. Briefly, the adversary specifies the challenge affine space before it sees the public parameters. The security game is defined by the following experiment, played by a challenger and an adversary A.
Challenge Space. The adversary A gives the challenger the dimension parameter 1 n and challenge vector matrix pair (x * 0 , X).
Setup. The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate (mpk, msk). It gives mpk to the adversary A. 
Definition 1.
A DSE scheme is selectively secure if all PPT adversaries achieve at most a negligible advantage in the above security game.
Computational Assumptions
We now briefly recall bilinear pairing groups and then state the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption that are required in our security proof.
A generator G which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a description G := (p, G, G T , e), where p is a prime of Θ(λ) bits, G and G T are cyclic groups of order p, and e : G×G → G T is a non-degenerate bilinear map. We require that the group operations in G and G T as well the bilinear map e are computable in deterministic polynomial time with respect to λ. Furthermore, the group descriptions of G and G T include generators of the respective cyclic groups. Assumption 1 (DBDH: Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption) Given a group generator G(1 λ ), we define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Algebraic Characterization for DSE
Next, we present a novel algebraic characterization of no instances for the DSE functionality, which we use crucially in the proof of security.
then we can efficiently compute z ∈ Z ℓ p such that
Remark 1.
Observe that the converse is also true. Suppose such a z exists. Then for all
Proof. Our goal is to find a column vector z ∈ Z ℓ p such that
If a solution exists, we can always find it efficiently using Gaussian elimination. Suppose on the contrary that a solution does not exist. Then, there must exist a (column) vector u ∈ Z d+1
Therefore, (x 0 ∥X)u ∈ ker(Y) and (x 0 ∥X)u ∈ (x 0 + span(X)).
This means
(x 0 + span(X)) ∩ ker(Y) ̸ = ∅, a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔
Doubly-Spatial Encryption

Construction
First, we describe the scheme without delegation.
, and output
, and message m ∈ G T , pick s ← r Z p and output
-KeyGen(mpk, msk, Y): On input Y ∈ Z n×ℓ p , pick r ← r Z ℓ p and output
Parse the ciphertext as (C 0 , C 1 , C 2 , C ′ ) and compute
Recover the message as
Claim. For all x, y, we have ⟨B ⊤ x, B −1 y⟩ = ⟨x, y⟩.
Correctness. Fix (x 0 , X) and Y such that (x 0 + span(X)) ∩ ker(Y) ̸ = ∅. Let (u, x ′ ) be the vectors computed by Dec(mpk, sk Y , ct (x 0 ,X) ) so that
We then compute the exponent on the second term as follows:
Therefore,
Correctness follows readily.
Proof of DSE Security
We prove the following theorem: 
⊤X
We need the first term to simulate the challenge ciphertext, whereas knowing the second term will help us answer secret key queries later by 'canceling out' terms we do not know how to compute. In addition, we pickw ← r Z n p and implicitly set
Simulating the public parameters and the challenge ciphertext is straight-forward.
The main challenge lies in simulating the secret key
which we may rewrite in terms of ab andw as ( g
) .
With some algebraic manipulation upon replacing B with terms we know (in particular, that we know a −1 · B
), it suffices to show how to simulate ( g
To achieve this, we program r to cancel out both ab and a −1 . Since (x * 0 + span(X)) ∩ ker(Y) = ∅, we can compute z ∈ Z ℓ p such that (x * 0 ) ⊤ Yz = 1 and X ⊤ Yz = 0 (c.f. Lemma 1). Then, we proceed as follows:
-we pickr ← r Z ℓ p and implicitly set r := ar − abz; -we can cancel out ab by using ⟨x * 0 , Yr⟩, namely
That is, we can simulate the expression above as:
Proof. We construct an adversary B for DBDH assumption using A. Recall that in DBDH assumption, the adversary is given D := (G; g, g a , g b , g s ), along with T , where T equals e(g, g) abs or is drawn uniformly from G T . Here, we assume that a ← r Z * p , which yields a 1/p negligible difference from DBDH assumption in the advantage; B proceeds as follows:
so that (X∥X) is a full rank matrix. Intuitively, we want to pick a random full rank B so that we can compute
We will need to know the first term to simulate the challenge ciphertext, whereas knowing the second term will help us answer secret key queries later by 'canceling out' terms we do not know how to compute. To achieve this, we pick a random full rank matrix Z∥Z ← r Z n×n p and implicitly set B ⊤ X = Z and B ⊤X = aZ, that is,
Observe that we can compute g B ⊤ as
In addition, we pickw ← Z n p and implicitly set ) .
First, we show how to compute the following expression ( g
To do this, the adversary B picksr ← r Z ℓ p and implicitly sets
where z is computed as in Lemma 1 so that (x * 0 ) ⊤ Yz = 1 and X ⊤ Yz = 0. Now, observe that
where in the last equality, we use the fact that (x * 0 ) ⊤ Yz = 1. In addition, we have
That is, given g, g a , g b along with x * 0 ,r, z, X,X, Y, we can compute the expression ( * ) as:
Next, we show how to simulate sk Y using the expression ( * ). Note that
where we can compute g ⟨w,B −1 Yr⟩ given K 1 = g B −1 Yr andw by computing a dot product in the exponent. Thus, it suffices to show how to compute K 1 using g X ⊤ Yr , g a −1X⊤ Yr . Recall that
Written this way, it is easy to see that given g X ⊤ Yr , g a −1X⊤ Yr along with Z,Z, we can compute
Challenge Ciphertext. Upon receiving two equal length messages m 0 and m 1 from A, B picks β ← r {0, 1} and outputs the challenge ciphertext as:
Note that r ′ is indeed uniformly random from Z ℓ ′ p (whenever γ ̸ = 0) sincer ← r Z ℓ ′ p . Now, observe that
The claim that delegation is independent of the path taken follows readily.
Proof of Security. It suffices to show how to compute mpk. On input selective challenge (x * 0 , X), we sample (X, Z,Z,w) as in Section 3.2, implicitly set We need to show how to compute the additional terms
Recall that
Then given g, g a along withγ, Z,Z, X,X, we can compute g γ(B −1 ) ⊤ (also obtain g γB −1 by matrix transpose) as
Also observe that 
Correctness
B NIPE from DSE
In this section, we show that NIPE can be naturally obtained from DSE defined in Section 2.1; our transformation is a special case of Hamburg's embedding of negated SE into DSE [14, Section 4.4] . In a NIPE scheme, both the ciphertext and the secret key are associated with vectors, a ciphertext ct x can be decrypted by a secret key sk y iff ⟨x, y⟩ ̸ = 0.
Embedding. We embed an n-dimensional NIPE system into an (n + 1)-dimensional DSE system as follows:
-for any secret key associated with a vector y ∈ Z n p , we embed it into the (n + 1)-dimensional vectorỹ, whereỹ -KeyGen(mpk, msk, y): On input y ∈ Z n p , pick r ← r Z p and output 
